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FLANNERY O'CONNOR, FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY AND THE
ANTIMODERNIST TRADITION

ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with the ways in which the work of writers
Flannery O'Connor and Fyodor Dostoevsky serves as a critique of the modern
world. No evidence exists to suggest a direct and conscious influence, yet an
examination of O'Connor's work reveals a remarkable similarity, both
thematically and stylistically, to that of Dostoevsky.

To illustrate their

traditional, orthodox perspective, both writers rely on the use of the
following techniques:

ironic humor, which is intended to underline the

ridiculousness of human existence without God; the creation of "doubles,"
characters who mirror the worst tendencies of the protagonists; and the use of
"epiphanic" scenes in which God is revealed as an active, positive force in the
lives of characters. These techniques are meant to illustrate a single idea: a
world without God is a world of chaos, strife and absurdity.
O'Connor and Dostoevsky, unlike most of the antimodernist critics who
were the subject of Jackson Lears's No Place of Grace , have formulated a
religiously based critique of historical modernity that is both unrelenting and
uncompromising.

Recognizing the alienation that often results from lack of

faith, both writers share much in common with existentialist philosophers.
Yet, because they focus so strongly on the need for faith above all else,
O'Connor and Dostoevsky may be more accurately described as "Christian
existentialist" writers.

Their common vision suggests that antimodernist

thought has not been confined primarily to a single century, nor to one region
or continent; rather, it is a viable intellectual tradition that has contributed a
great deal toward arriving at an understanding of the shortcomings and
imperfections of life in the modern world.

KATHERINE HEMPLE PROWN
DEPARTMENT OF AMERICAN STUDIES
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA

FLANNERY O'CONNOR, FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY
AND THE ANTIMODERNIST TRADITION

In No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture,
Jackson Lears explores the roots of the American antimodernist tradition.
being a product of twentieth-century disillusionment,

Rather than

Lears argues, antimodernist

protest is rooted in the Victorian era, an age which historians have traditionally
characterized as possessing a blind faith in "Progress," science and technology. In Lears's
opinion, a substantial number of nineteenth-century cultural leaders in Europe and
America viewed the West's increasing fascination with material progress as being both
misdirected and potentially dangerous.

Antimodernist sentiment assumed various forms,

from the anti-mass production rhetoric of the Arts and Crafts movement, to the
therapeutic remedies offered by leaders of "The Cult of the Strenuous Life." What united
these disparate groups was the common assumption that so-called Progress created as
many problems as it was supposed to solve. The solution to overcoming the sense of
alienation that modernization tended to promote lay in developing some alternative mode of
existence.

But instead of providing alternatives to the more alienating aspects of

modernization, these movements, according to Lears, only managed to ease the transition,
providing various means for promoting the widespread acceptance of the "modern way of
life" and its inherent value system. The end result is that the antimodernist tradition has
largely been reduced to the level of cliche, with little of value to contribute toward a
critical understanding of the modern condition and the profound cultural changes that have
occurred during the last century.
Lears

has purposely

limited the scope of his study, primarily focusing on

nineteenth-century northeastern culture in America.

He concerns himself only briefly

with twentieth-century antimodernism, or with various movements that have developed
outside America and Western

Europe. This exclusion is significant, for as Lears

acknowledges, antimodernist movements in America and Europe were often spearheaded by
political and cultural elites who stood to profit from the very forms of material progress
they were criticizing.

It may be argued, then, that antimodernist movements originating

in regions that have yet to experience the benefits of modernization may be less
influential, but perhaps more radical and more insightful, than those movements that have
stemmed from within the urban and cultural centers of America and Western Europe.
Viewed in this light, the work of writers Flannery O'Connor and her literary and
philosophical forebear, Fyodor Dostoevsky, plays an important role in the history of
antimodernist thought. Neither writer is concerned with promoting any particular
antimodernist "remedies" similar to those advocated by leaders of the Arts and Crafts or
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"Back to Nature" movements.

What O'Connor and Dostoevsky offer instead is a critique

far more profound than those outlined by Lears, one which steadfastly demands of modern
humanity an unwavering commitment to resisting "Progress" and the attendant forces of
materialism,

science and

technology.

Both

writers share a unique perspective on the

modern condition that was fueled by their common status as outsiders:

O'Connor was a

Southerner at a time when the region was under attack for its civil rights policies and its
generally "backward" way of life, a Catholic in a region that was predominately
Protestant, and a woman in a profession that has been traditionally dominated by men;
Dostoevsky was an adamant Slavophile during a time in Russian history that was
characterized by a widespread fascination with European culture and an increasing
suspicion of the Orthodox Church, as well as by increasing discontent with Russia's
seeming inability to promote industrialization and modernization.

Less enamored of "the

modern way of life" than many of their contemporaries, O'Connor and Dostoevsky
developed a far more critical approach to the problems of the modern world. To them the
solution to overcoming alienation is more complex than merely finding "self-fulfillment"
in taking up a hobby or in returning to the "simple way of life."
Both writers view the necessity of resisting the alienating forces of modernity as a
matter as urgent as life and death, for they share the viewpoint promoted by various
existentialist thinkers that the crisis of modern culture
implications.

holds profound spiritual

Like many existentialists, O'Connor and Dostoevsky believe the seemingly

chaotic, absurd, and often ridiculous aspects of modern existence stem largely from the
sense of emptiness, or as Nietzsche expressed it, the "weightlessness," that has resulted
from

the

decline

of

religion

in

Western

culture

(Lears

41).

But

unlike

most

existentialists, these writers view the human condition through the lens of orthodox
Christianity.

Emphatically rejecting the atheistic implications of most existentialist

philosophy, they dismiss the notion that alienation can be overcome either through
transcendence of the physical or through the matter-of-fact acceptance of the essential
meaninglessness of existence.

Here they part company with philosophers like Karl

Jaspers and Jean-Paul Sartre, and join ranks with philosophers like Soren Kierkegaard,
whose views on the human condition are colored by an explicitely Christian orientation.

It

is the "Christian existentialist" perspective that constitutes the strongest philosophical
bond between O'Connor and Dostoevsky, and that best illustrates the ties linking the more
radical nineteenth and twentieth-century antimodernist forms.
Although the relationship of O'Connor's work to American literature and culture has
been widely commented upon, her connection to philosophical and literary trends outside
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the United States has largely been left unexplored.

Robert Drake, reflecting the view of a

number of critics, contends that O'Connor's work will
other "major-minor" writers.

ultimately be ranked with that of

"Her range was narrow," he argues, "and perhaps she had

only one story to tell" (42).

O'Connor, however, was hardly the narrow-minded

provincialist critics often label her; she was, despite her conservative, "Southern"
viewpoint, very much in tune with the philosophical issues and concerns of the twentieth
century (Asals 31). Much of her work was written as a well thought-out defense of the
Christian

perspective

against critiques

made

by various

secularist writers

and

philosophers. Yet as Thomas Merton notes, O'Connor's fiction deals not merely with issues
and themes that are pertinent to the South or to the twentieth century but with ideas and
questions that have plagued the human mind from time immemorial.

"That is why," he

concludes, "when I read Flannery, I don't think of Hemingway, or Katherine Anne Porter...
but rather of someone like Sophocles" (257).

The relationship of O'Connor's work to that

of Dostoevsky is thus well worth examining, for it illustrates the true scope and depth of
her literary vision, a vision that transcends the limits of her conservative, Southern
background. No evidence exists in either her fiction or her published correspondence to
suggest that O'Connor was consciously influenced by Dostoevsky. Nevertheless, a
comparison of the work of the two writers reveals a strong philosophical and religious
affinity, one arising not so much out of a direct influence, but rather out of a common body
of ideas and concerns.
Perhaps what best illustrates the philosophical bond between O'Connor and
Dostoevsky is their mutual reliance on the assumption that modern humanity has
abandoned God, paving the way for the makings of a world in which there is "No pleasure
but meaness" and where "All is permitted." To illustrate this perspective, the writers
employ highly similar literary techniques: the use of ironic humor to underscore the
ridiculousness of human existence without God; the repeated use of "double" characters
who mimic in distorted form the nihilistic and paranoid ideas of the protagonists; and
finally, the use of "epiphanic" scenes in which characters experience the grace of God
through a vision, dream, or through some catastrophic experience.

Each of these varied

techniques is used to emphasize a single idea - that a world without God is a world of
chaos, strife and absurdity.

To envision a world without God is a uniquely modern ability, argues Lears in No
Place of Grace. The decline of religious sentiment, in his view, is directly traceable to the
nineteenth-century

and

its

increasing

fascination

with

science

and

technology.
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Mainstream Protestantism

during

edge and slowly adopted an

that period

increasingly

gradually lost

relativistic

its

theology

harsh,

Calvinistic

(Lears 23).

Fire and

brimstone sermons began to lose meaning to a generation of people who no longer believed
in Satan and who viewed Hell as little more than a metaphor for guilt and suffering (Lears
43).

Religion was no longer seen as an instrument for salvation, but rather as a vehicle

to be used for experiencing the "intensity" of spiritual

existence

(Lears xv). Stripped of

its meaning, religion finally lost any of its true significance for most nineteenth-century
intellectuals, who began to look instead to the theories of Darwin and other scientists to
provide explanations for the world around them (Lears

xvii).

Thus two of the major characteristics of "modernism,” in Lears's view, are the
decline of religious sentiment and the rise of a secular orientation that places faith in
science and technology. What Lears terms "historical modernism" is to be distinguished,
however, from the artistic and literary "Modernist" movement of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. The Modernist movement in the arts arose in reaction to, and
not in support of, the process of modernization.

Modernist writers like W.B. Yeats and

T.S. Eliot are in reality "antimodern," according to Lears.

"Most modernist authors in the

twentieth century," he writes, "have been hostile to the secular, urban, bourgeois culture
of the modern West. In large measure, literary modernism arose as both religious and
secular dissent from historical modernity" (296). "Modernist" artists and intellectuals,
according to historian Daniel Joseph Singal, used their work to protest against the
sterility of Victorian concepts of civilization and morality, which placed a strong
emphasis on rationality, progress, and the perfectibility of the human condition.

"The

recognition of man's irrational nature, the acceptance of an open and unpredictable
universe, the notion of conflict as inherently virtuous, the tolerance of uncertainty, and
the drive toward probing criticism -- all are," according to Singal, "part of the Modernist
effort to reintegrate the human consciousness and thus to liberate man from the
restrictive culture of enforced innocence with which the century began" (8). The
Modernists to whom Singal refers share much in common, then, with the antimodernists
who are the subject of Lears's study (Lears xvii).

Both groups, according to Lears,

dissented from the prevailing world view of their time, finding in modern culture a naive
sense of optimism and a stultifying lack of vitality and authenticity:

The antimodern impulse stemmed from revulsion against the process of
rationalization

first

described

by

Max

W eber

-

the

systematic

organization of economic life for maximum productivity and of individual
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life for maximum personal achievement; the drive for efficient control of
nature under the banner of improving human welfare; the reduction of the
world to a disenchanted object to be manipulated by rational technique
(7).

The antimodernists whom Lears discusses often included people like Theodore
Roosevelt, spokesman for the "Cult of the Strenuous Life" and a major proponent of
organized sports and outdoor living. His only complaint about modern life centered around
the fact that, in his opinion, it tended to promote "softness," that the comforts and
amenities of the modern home threatened to rob people of their health and vitality (Lears
108).

As the product of a wealthy and privileged background and as a highly respected

political leader, Roosevelt, along with similiar antimodernist spokesmen, did not desire to
change the status quo in any way but sought only to improve existing conditions through
various palliative remedies.

Therefore, rather than combatting the

mass production of

goods and the detrimental effects of factory regimentalization on workers, leaders of the
Arts and Crafts movement, for example, instead advocated woodworking and other crafts as
a means of promoting workmanship and providing a creative outlet for bored and alienated
laborers. Very few antimodernist leaders, Lears concludes, actually managed to develop
any sort of effective analysis of the process of modernizaton and the cultural changes it
produced.
In Lears's opinion, Henry Adams stands as one of the few examples of a genuine
antimodernist, a man who not only developed a well thought-out philosophical critique of
modern culture, but one who also attempted to live according to the dictates of that
philosphy. Skeptical of many of the claims made by scientific leaders, Adams became an
amateur scientist, hoping to use his knowledge as a means of illustrating the limits of a
purely rational approach.

Uncomfortable with the roles imposed upon him by Victorian

society, he embraced the "feminine" realm of nurturing and domesticity (Lears 262). In
short, Adams was able to rise above the narrow value system imposed upon him by
Victorian society. By refusing to allow the circumstances of his background to stand in the
way of his intellectual growth, he was free to develop a truly insightful analysis of the
modern cultural crisis. "A product of psychic, class, and cultural circumstances,"

Lears

concludes, "his work transcended them all to become a major critique of modern values in
crisis"

(2 9 6 ).

Despite the analyses of astute critics like Adams,

Lears contends that the

antimodernist movement under its various guises has largely been a failure.

However
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disenchanted they may have been with "historical modernity," antimodernists were
nevertheless incapable of resisting accommodation.

"Half-commited to modernization,

writes Lears, "the antimodernists unwittingly allowed modern culture to absorb and
diffuse their dissent. Unable to transcend bourgeois values, they often ended by
neutralizing them" (57). Too many antimodernists, like Theodore Roosevelt, stood to
benefit both from the financial and the physical comforts of material and technological
progress. The only lasting contribution that antimodernism in

America has made, then,

has been to serve warning to those who place implicit faith in the ability of science to
answer profound metaphysical questions and in the ability of technology to create a better
world without exacting a cost.

"The antimodernist dissenters," Lears concludes, "despite

their drift toward accommodation, nevertheless preserved a powerful insight, a feeling,
sometimes clearly articulated and sometimes only dimly sensed, that the modern secular
utopia was after all a fraud”

(300).

Had Lears extended the scope of his study beyond the limits of nineteenth-century
northeastern America, he might have developed a somewhat different view of the
antimodernist tradition. His analysis implies that because the northeastern states have
enjoyed "cultural hegemony," determining not only the economic and political course of
the nation but the development of its cultural values as well, then any antimodernist
movements that have sprung from outside the region have necessarily been of little
significance to American culture as a whole. Other scholars have argued, however, that an
antimodernist tradition developed in the South that exerted a strong influence on the
course of American history, ultimately leading the nation to fight a civil war.

Anne Norton

suggests that prior to the Civil War there had developed two distinct regional cultures, one
Northern and one Southern. "The traits whose continuance Southern culture endeavored to
secure were intimately related to the Southern affirmation of classical republican
ideology, the primacy of agriculture, and provision as a source of political authority"
(Norton 134).

Within this framework, the family figured as the basic unit of social and

economic organization. In the North there developed, along with industrialization, an
entirely different set of values promoting legal-rational authority and objective law, an
economic system based on rationalization, and the state rather than the family as the
primary unit of social and economic organization (Norton 295). In its resistance to
industrialization and the values it promoted, Southern culture remained skeptical of the
benefits of modernization.
Northern victory during the Civil War, Norton argues,

guaranteed the subordination
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of the South's conservative values, but other factors guaranteed that those values would
continue to remain a part of the Southern cultural tradition.

Richard W eaver contends

that the South's defeat in many ways actually helped to solidify its conservative world
view (34).

The

Civil

War and

the sense

of

tragedy

it created

reinforced

the

Southern tendency to believe that certain forces are simply beyond rational human
control.

The concept of rationalization is alien to the Southern tradition, according to

Weaver, as is the accompanying belief that the logical application of science and reason can
uncover the secrets of the natural world (31-34).

Thus the Southern mind views science

as a "false messiah," one that can never supplant the "true" Messiah, Jesus Christ.

This

unbending insistence on Christian values tends to promote general suspicion of liberal,
relativistic philosophy, and often degenerates, in Weaver's opinion, into a close-minded
form of anti-intellectualism (42).

Yet whatever its shortcomings,

he concludes, the

South has nevertheless managed throughout its history to promote a value system that
remains skeptical of the ability of science, technology, and material progress to solve the
problems of modern existence (389).
Despite this skepticism, however, the South has promoted modernization as much as
any other region. According to Daniel Singal, though the South lagged behind in its efforts
to industrialize, it eventually came to embrace "Progress" as enthusiastically as the rest
of the nation. So too did the South come to embrace the values and beliefs associated with
industrialization. "One finds the same worship of material success," writes Singal, "the
same insistence on diligence and practicality, the same outlook of steadfast optimism. More
striking still, these values associated with industrial progress were joined with and
subsumed under the moral code of gentility, in the South as in England" (23).

This "New

South" creed differs little from the modernist value system that Lears attributes to the
northeastern states of roughly the same period.

Literary critic Louis D. Rubin Jr. agrees

with this assessment of the post Civil-War South.

He argues, however, that what is

important is not whether or not the South succeeded in resisting industrialization and the
values associated with it. What is important is that the South continues to view itself and
its values as different from those of the rest of the nation.

In his introduction to the third

printing of I'll Take Mv Stand. Rubin defends the authors' assertion that the agrarian
agenda they present has its roots in Southern tradition:

For there was

a southern tradition worthy of preservation, and it had

little or nothing to do with racial segregation, Protestant orthodoxy, or
states'

rights:

it

was

that

of

the good

society,

the community of
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individuals, the security and definition that come when men cease to wage
an unrelenting war with nature and enjoy their leisure and their human
dignity. If never in the history of the South had that goal been fully
realized and however much it had been largely restricted to only a part of
the

population,

it

was not thereby rendered any less desirable a

standard to be cherished. At least it had been

in men's

thoughts

(xx-xxi).

The South, however "modern'' it may be, nevertheless continues to view itself as a region
that appreciates "unmodern” values based on respect for community, God, nature, and the
"simple things in life," values that have become increasingly ephemeral and elusive in a
world that has all but abandoned its traditional past.

Like the Agrarians, Flannery O'Connor viewed the South as a region that continued to
appreciate traditional values. But like a number of other artists born and raised in the
South, O'Connor at one time felt a need to escape what she believed to be the restrictive
intellectual climate of her native land {Letters 224).

She completed graduate work at

the School for Writers at the University of Iowa, and later lived for brief periods in New
York and Connecticut. Although she enjoyed her stay in Connecticut, where she lived with
close friends who were also "expatriates," she generally felt uncomfortable and out of
place living north of the Mason-Dixon line.

In one of her characteristically wry letters

she describes what life has been like in New York for Enoch Emery, one of the characters
she created while living there:

Enoch didn't care too much for New York. He said there wasn't no privetcy
(sic) there. Everytime he went to sit in the bushes there was already
somebody sitting there ahead of him. He was very nervous before we left
and somebody at the Partisan Review told him to go to the analyst.

He

went and the analyst said what was wrong with him was his daddy's fault
and Enoch was so mad that anybody should defame his daddy that he pushed
the analyst out the window. You can see why we would never last in New
York

(21).

She goes on to write that Enoch is disgruntled at having to appear in the Partisan Review:
he would much prefer to be in Click, a magazine with lots of pictures.

O'Connor believed
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that she and her cast of characters from rural Georgia could never be at home in a
sophisticated place like New York City, where people read intellectual magazines like the
Partisan

Review

and where people with problems visit the analyst instead of the

preacher.
Her experiences living "up North" provided O'Connor with a different perspective on
the South, one which lead her to a greater appreciation of the region's virtues:

If you're a writer and the South is what you know, then it's what you'll
write about and how you judge it will depend on how you judge yourself.
It's perhaps good and necessary to get away from it physically for a while,
but this is by no means to escape it. I stayed away from the time I was 20
until I was 25 with the notion that the life of my writing depended on my
staying away.

I would certainly have persisted in that delusion had I not

got very ill and had to come home. The best of my writing has been done
here (Letters 230).

As the South came under increasing attack for its racial policies, O'Connor became more
vehement in her defense of the region (Coles 50).

In many of the "grotesque" characters

she created who, like Enoch, could never have sprung from anywhere but the South, she
saw one virtue: they continued to struggle, albeit in often misdirected and comical ways,
against the temptations of the modern secular world. To O'Connor the beauty of the South
and its people lay in their various attempts to resist secularization, a virtue she believed
to be acutely lacking in the rest of the nation (Coles 60).

In her opinion, the South

understood better than any other region the futility of attempting to supplant God with the
forces of science and technology:

The notion of the perfectibility of man came about at the time of the
Enlightenment

in the

18th

century. This

is what the

South

has

traditionally opposed. 'How far we have fallen' means the fall of Adam, the
fall from innocence, from sanctifying grace.

The South in other words

still believes that man has fallen and that he is only perfectible by God's
grace, not by his own unaided efforts.

The Liberal approach is that man

has never fallen, never incurred guilt, and is ultimately perfectible by
his own efforts. Therefore, evil in this light is a problem of better
housing, sanitation, health, etc. ( Letters 302-303).
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This attitude is best exhibited in O'Connor's views on the Civil Rights movement. She
understood well enough the need for social justice, but she resented the implication that
the rest of the country was morally superior to the "evil" South.

Thus while the nation

concerned itself with integration and how it could best be legislated, she wrote
"Everything That Rises Must Converge."

The story, though it is set on a newly integrated

bus somewhere in the South, manages to ignore the social, political, and even the racial
issues behind the problem of integration (Coles 43). The setting is not used, as one might
imagine, as a vehicle for illustrating the changing position of Southern blacks but rather
as a vehicle for provoking Julian's final revelation that he is not the independent,
progressive-minded person he considers himself to be.

In reality he is inextricably

bound to his mother and all the traditions, racial or otherwise, that she represents.

In one

of her letters O'Connor comments that in the story, as far as the "race issue" is concerned
she intends to "say a plague on everybody's house" (537).

From her point of view, all of

God's creatures, be they black or white, living in the North or the South, share
responsibility for the sins of the world.

Redemption, not politics, is what is important to

her.
Sin, in O'Connor's opinion, could be found everywhere, not just in the South.

Nor

could sin be eradicated through legislation or reform; God's grace is the only force that can
help the world rid itself of sin (Coles 12).

This perspective is vividly illustrated in the

briefly sketched but nonetheless powerful character of Old Tarwater, the backwoods
prophet of The Violent Bear It Away. To the typical modern reader Tarwater comes across
as nothing more than a crazy old man, plagued by visions and voices that no doubt spring
from some form of psychological affliction.
Tarwater in this way.
liberal

Most of the early critics of the novel viewed

O'Connor, for her part, took a certain amount of pride in provoking

prostestations with

outrageous,

characters like Old Tarwater (Drake16).

though

to her

mind

perfectly

legitimate,

"The modern reader," she admits, "will identify

himself with the schoolteacher, but it is the old man who speaks for me" (Letters

350).

Her main fear about reviews of the novel was that her liberal, secular-minded audience
would not

be provoked by the book but that it would merely be characterized as yet

another "Southern Gothic" novel and thereby dismissed altogether.

She writes, "I am not

afraid that the book will be controversial, I'm afraid it will not be controversial.

I'm

afraid it will just be damned and dropped, genteely sneered at, a few superior kicks from
one or two and that will be that" (Letters 358).

She created Old Tarwater with a modern

reader in mind, hoping to use his outrageous backwoods zeal as a means of eliciting some
form of

thoughtful response in the minds of what she believed to be a cynical and
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complacent audience of non-believers.
O'Connor would likely have agreed with Lears's assertion that liberal Protestantism
has contributed to the widespread feeling, among intellectuals at least, of religious apathy.
Old Tarwater, she argues, could never have been a traditional Protestant, for like the late
nineteenth-century critics of religion whom Lears discusses, she believes that modern
Protestantism is for the most part an empty religion, devoid of any true sense of God's
being:

The Old man is very obviously not a Southern Baptist, but a prophet in the
true sense. The true prophet is inspired by the Holy Ghost, not
necessarily

by the

dominant

religion of his

region.

Further,

the

traditional Protestant bodies of the South are evaporating into secularism
and respectability and are being replaced on the grass-roots level by all
sorts of strange sects... and sometimes [by] the genuinely inspired
( L etters 407).

in her view, the Catholic Church is the only religious body that has effectively resisted
the drift toward secularism plaguing modern organized religion. Despite his own ignorance
of formal theology and organized religion, Tarwater, according to O'Connor, is a character
who has managed to become a what she terms a "natural Catholic": a visionary who has
been able to rise above the limitations of his religious background and come to a genuine
(i.e. Catholic) understanding of God.
In some ways, then, O'Connor's critique of modern culture, as far as religion is
concerned, parallels the arguments used by the Victorian antimodernists Lears discusses.
Like them, she believes that religion has lost meaning to a people imbued with values that
promote the wonders of humanity over those of God. As Lears notes, many of the Victorian
antimodernist leaders, like the prominent architect Ralph Adams Cram, turned to
Catholicism as a means of compensating for what they felt to be lacking in mainstream
Protestantism (202).

Cram and others like him were searching for a religion that

continued to emphasize symbolism, ritual, and the mysteries of the natural world.

The

appeal of Catholicism lay in its theological certainty, its insistence upon absolute moral
laws and upon the existence of sin and evil.
intensity they

believed

to

Yearning to revive the religious fervor and

be characteristic of medieval

Catholicism,

Protestant

authorities, according to Lears, began to develop an unprecedented interest in religious art
and ritual:
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The secularized postmillennialism pervading the churches undermined
[a] premodern attitude at every point.

It questioned self-abnegation and

supernaturalism; it proclaimed a knowable, improvable universe; it
deified human purpose. To the extent that religious aestheticism sought to
rekindle a sense of transcendence, it embodied an attempt to recapture a
vanishing, God-centered world view (195).

But as with other antimodernist remedies of that era, the Catholic movement ultimately
failed to revive widespread religious sentiment.

Few Protestant leaders or laypeople were

interested in radically transforming the theological basis of their religion.

What appealed

to them instead was a religious setting that removed worship from the realm of the
everyday, one alluding to a time in the past when religious fervor inspired people to lives
of great heroism and self-sacrifice (Lears 194).

As interest in and tolerance for

Catholicism increased, Protestant churches began to adopt a more ornate, symbol-oriented
decor drawing heavily on medieval Catholic forms.

Many parishes even sponsored the

building of Protestant cathedrals, a course of action that would never have been tolerated
by the Lutherans, Puritans or other early Protestant sects. As Lears concludes, however,
the Catholic movement merely resulted in a superficial emphasis on the "theatrical over
the

introspective"

(1 94).

Protestant

theology,

with

its

increasingly

therapeutic

orientation, remained essentially unchanged.
Like the Victorian antimodernists, O'Connor recognizes the need for a more
profound religious theology than that which is offered by mainstream Protestantism.
Her critique of modern religion, however, goes much further:

she believes it

necessary to adopt more than Catholic symbolism and decor. Catholicism, in her view,
is the only religion that genuinely understands the nature of God's being:

One of the effects of modern liberal Protestantism has been to turn
religion into poetry and therapy, to make truth vaguer and ... more
relative, to banish intellectual distinctions, to depend on feeling instead of
thought, and gradually to come to believe that God has no power, that he
cannot communicate with us... and that religion is our own sweet
invention. I believe what the Church teaches — that God has given us
reason to use and that it can lead toward a knowledge of him, through
analogy; that he has revealed himself in history and continues to do so
through the Church, and that he is present (not just symbolically)

in the
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Eucharist on our altars... I find it reasonable to believe even though these
beliefs are beyond reason (Letters 479).

In O'Connor's view, one is mistaken to assume that because God's existence cannot be
scientifically proven it is irrational to worship Him.

To attempt to apply the laws of

science and rationalism to faith is futile and will only lead to frustration and doubt.

Yet,

paradoxically, once the decision to believe is made, it will only be reinforced by the
careful application of one's reason and intellect, for God will reveal Himself to those whose
minds are receptive.

As Christ's emissary on earth, the Catholic Church, O'Connor

believes, acts as the mediator between God and humanity, providing those who believe with
the sacramental means necessary to experience God's grace. By insisting on the concept of
an active, living and knowable God, Catholicism, in her opinion, is the only religion that
can effectively resist the secularizing forces of modernism.

In focusing on religion, or the lack of it, as being the major crisis facing the modern
world, O'Connor shares much in common with existentialist philosophers, many of whom
are themselves critics of modernism.

According to F.M. Heinemann, one of the themes

uniting the various schools of existentialist thought is the concept of alienation:

Alienation is a fact. There exists a feeling of estrangement in modern man
which has considerably increased during the last hundred years.

It is

connected with certain changes in human society, with the agglomeration
of millions of people in great cities cut off from Nature, with the
Industrial Revolution, and with the collectivizing trend bound up with
machine production (9).

The problem for modern humanity, as Heinemann sees it, centers around technology.
Mankind must struggle to overcome "technological alienation," that is, the sense of
estrangement that has resulted from the subordination of the spiritual and the religious to
the realm of the material and the technological (Heinemann 14).

Modern existentialist

thought, according to Heinemann, began with Kierkegaard. Recognizing the inadequacy of
both Marx's emphasis on materialsm

and Hegel's abstraction of spirituality and religion,

Kierkegaard insisted on a philosophy based on a Christian perspective (Heinemann 33).
For Kierkegaard, the only means of overcoming alienation is through faith in God and
Christ.

Later existentialists, though often insisting on the need for a secular perspective,
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nevertheless recognized that estrangement from God and nature had lead to a widespread
sense of the absurdity and meaninglessness of life (Heinemann 167).

Philosophers like

Heidegger and Sartre, however, insisted that the only means of escaping alienation was to
be found in facing death and in accepting the fact that behind it lay "nothingness" (Barrett
66).

Religion, according to this view, is an instrument of oppression, used to restrict

human freedom, and impairing the ability of humanity to transcend its age-old need for a
spiritual security blanket (Roberts 216).

Only when mankind accepts responsibility for

its own existence will true freedom be achieved (Kaufmann 47).
the

need for religion or

on the need

Yet whether insisting on

to escape it, most modern-day existentialists

nevertheless agree that humanity is experiencing a spiritual crisis of unprecedented
proportion.
O'Connor's antimodernist vision was in many ways inspired by the existentialist
climate of her day.

Various critics of O'Connor's work have downplayed her relationship

to contemporary philosophical and literary trends, suggesting instead that her orthodox
view of the world springs not from a contemporary view but from a medieval one (Stevens
4).

Other critics, however, have recognized that much of her work was directly

influenced by the intellectual atmosphere in which she was working, particularly by
existentialist writers like Samuel Beckett, Eugene Ionesco, Franz Kafka and Albert Camus
(Walters 157).

O'Connor read much of the latest existentialist writings and was

well-versed in the tenets of the philosophy.

Though she had not yet read his work when

she wrote Wise Blood, the novel nevertheless reveals an orientation that shares much in
common with Kierkegaard, a philosopher whose work she later studied and came to admire
(Asals 29-30).

Like Kierkegaard, she adheres to a form of existentialism that insists on

the need for adopting Christian faith as the answer to the pain and uncertainty of living in
a materially obsessed and spiritually empty world.
Though

most twentieth-century

existentialist thought stems

from

a

secular

perspective, an existentialist viewpoint has been a standard aspect of Christian theology
since the Middle Ages (Roberts 3).

Early Christian theologians recognized estrangement

from God as one of the more complicated dilemmas of religious life, a dilemma which could
be solved only through faith alone (Menu 21-22).

W hereas a secularist like Sartre

would insist that one must accept "nothingness" as a fact of life, a "Christian
existentialist" like Kierkegaard would insist that one must make a "blind leap of faith,"
trusting in God to deliver humanity from its spiritual alienation and despair. From this
perspective it is Originial Sin, mankind's fall from grace, which has lead to estrangement
from God.

Only through suffering, grace and redemption can humanity come again to know
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and accept God's love (Menu 22). Contrary to what most mainstream existentialists would
insist, the Christian existentialist does not accept lack of freedom as being the price paid
for religion.

Humanity has been given absolute freedom in the face of God -- the freedom

to choose faith over doubt, good over evil -- and it is this very freedom which has led
humanity to turn away from God. Only by exercising this freedom as a means of coming to
accept God can an individual escape from the spiritual despair that so often accompanies
atheism (Roberts 10).
O'Connor, as a Christian existentialist writer, is very much concerned with the issue
of freedom. "God made us to love Him, " she writes. "It takes two to love. It takes liberty.
It takes the right to reject" (Letters 354).

She believes that a God who forced people to

worship and love Him would not be a God worthy of respect. In her view, however, this
freedom is not to be confused with license (Walters 147).

To O'Connor freedom implies

certain moral and ethical responsibilities (Mystery and Manners

153).

Hazel Motes, the

protagonist of Wise Blood, embodies both the human impulse toward freedom and the
impulse to abuse it.

Like young Tarwater, who faces a similar religious dilemma, Haze

uses his freedom to reject God and His moral order.

His blasphemy, however, takes on a

mechanical and half-hearted form, and eventually Haze realizes that his attempts to
embrace nihilism have brought him nothing but despair.

Indeed, most of O'Connor's

characters who do attempt to reject God suffer the alienating and often traumatic
consequences.

Haze's despair leads him to practise an extreme form of asceticism that

degenerates finally into self-mutilation and torture.

Tarwater's rejection of his role as a

prophet leads him to an encounter with the Devil that ends in a painful and humiliating
rape.

Other characters, like the Grandmother of "A Good Man is Hard to Find," suffer

similar fates:

she is forced to witness the brutal murder of her family while waiting for

her own death at the hands of the Misfit; Mrs. Greenleaf of the story "Greenleaf" dies after
being impaled by an infuriated bull; Julian suffers an emotional breakdown after helping
to provoke his mother's stroke in "Everything That Rises Must Converge." The list of
violent deaths and nervous breakdowns in O'Connor's fiction is endless, but they are used
to prove a point.

Robert Drake writes of her use of violent action: "Her damned characters

prepare their own ends, they do choose this day whom they will serve. And she refuses to
let them off the hook by interfering with the consequences of their actions, which are
inevitable" (36).

O'Connor's characters act at once as living embodiments of the human

desire for freedom at any cost and as warnings to those who would use this freedom as a
means of rejecting God.
Were O'Connor an atheist, the fates her characters suffer would seem bleak indeed.
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From her perspective, however, physical suffering and death are far from being the worst
trials a person can endure (Driskell and Brittain 11). To describe these suffering
characters as "damned" is to misunderstand her message. Only through these catastrophic
experiences do characters like Haze, Tarwater, the Grandmother, Mrs. Greenleaf and
Julian ever come to realize their need for salvation.

What most of her characters share

in common is an inflated sense of self-pride and a belief that they are free to act as they
please with no regard for the consequences of their actions. "For Flannery O'Connor,"
argues Dorothy Walters, "the instruction of pride through the lessons of humility is, in
each story, the means by which the soul is prepared for its necessary illumination by the
Holy Spirit" (73).

Thus physical violence is not merely

a

gratuitous

aspect of

O'Connor's fictional universe. Rather, violence is used as the instrument by which God
bestows His grace upon those prideful characters who view freedom as a license to do as
they please, regardless of the moral implications of their actions.
O'Connor shares with existentialist critics the understanding that freedom is
essential to the human spirit.

Yet unlike such "mainstream" existentialists as Camus or

Sartre, who believe humanity to be bound only by certain "natural" laws which are beyond
the realm of morality, she believes there to exist an unbending, God-given code of
morality that may only be violated at a price (Heinemann 128).

She also shares certain

sentiments with the late nineteenth-century antimodernists who viewed Protestantism as
an ultimately unsatisfying religion, with a theology too often prone to change with the
prevailing notions of the time and with symbolic forms too often lacking in both content
and meaning. O'Connor, however, believes there to be a single and irrefutable answer to
the problems of the modern world, and that lies in returning to God and learning to accept
His grace.

Much of her fiction centers around the often comic attempts of her characters

who, lacking the religiously based structural forms through which they might experience
grace, must search blindly on their own for a means of communicating with God:

The religion of the South is a do-it-yourself religion, something which I
as a Catholic find painful and touching and grimly comic. It is full of
unconscious pride that lands them in all sorts of religious predicaments.
They have nothing to correct their practical heresies and so they work
them out dramatically.

If this were merely comic to me it would be no

good, but I accept the same fundamental doctrines of sin and redemption
and judgement that they do (Letters 350).
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The South, in O'Connor's opinion, comes close to a genuine understanding of God, but
without a religion that provides the sacramental means of experiencing divine grace, the
region will only continue to resist secularization in the same painful and haphazard ways
as characters like Haze and Tarwater (Letters 350).

To O'Connor experiencing God's

grace requires more than faith alone. To experience grace truly one must actively and
consciously

participate in the sacramental life, above all in the Eucharist, which she

considers to be the most essential sacrament. In her view the Eucharist is more than the
symbolic presence of Christ at the alter; it is the literal Body of Christ being offered again
in sacrifice so that those who partake may share in His love and redemption (Letters
125). Any antimodernist critique that does not acknowledge the need for participation in
the sacramental

life, the very core of Catholicism,

is in O'Connor's opinion ultimately

flawed.

At first glance it appears that, in her emphasis on the virtues of Southern culture
and the Catholic Church, O'Connor developed a somewhat obscure critique of the modern
condition that shares more in common with the ideas and concerns expressed by Allen Tate
and the Agrarians than with the viewpoint of the more cosmopolitan antimodernists of the
Victorian age.

O'Connor's world view was of course born of a unique combination of

regional, cultural and historical conditions; yet at the same time her perspective bears a
curious resemblance to the philosophical orientation of nineteenth-century Russian
writer Fyodor Dostoevsky.

A number of factors contributed to this unlikely bond.

Dostoevsky, like O'Connor, was born into a conservative, tradition-bound culture
undergoing profound change, rapidly developing from a rural, agrarian society into one
which was increasingly more urban and industrialized. During the eighteenth century
Russia was an agricultural society divided into a strict hierarchical order composed
primarily of three distinct classes -- the nobility, the peasantry, and the serfs.

By the

early nineteenth century, however, these simple divisions were beginning to crumble.
The Napoleonic Wars of 1812 -1815 exerted a liberalizing influence throughout Russia,
as thousands of officers who had served abroad returned home full of praise for Western
Europe and its democratic ideals. Socialist groups like The Union of Welfare, composed
mainly of aristocratic intellectuals, began to promote democratic reforms, calling for
equality of all classes under the law, freedom of religion and the press, promotion of
industry for the advancement of economic security, abolishment of serfdom and the
establishment of a constitutional monarchy (Dmytryshyn
although founded

by people of wealth and rank,

14-15).

These groups,

exerted little influence outside the
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intelligentsia and were generally tolerated by Alexander I.

But with his death in 1825

came a period of increased surveillance of political "subversives" and increased agitation
for reform.
place.

Only after the ascension of Alexander II did any genuine reforms actually take

Russia's defeat in the Crimean War convinced a number of the tsar's advisors that

the nation's antiquated economic system had seriously impaired its ability to compete
throughout the world.

A program of reform, designed to encourage modernization, was

developed to include the following: the abolishment of serfdom and the promotion of
industry; increased state involvement in education, public health, internal improvements
and social welfare; and the introduction of a legal system based on written law and trial by
jury (Dmytryshyn 21).

In short, what Alexander II encouraged was national development

based on the "modern" democratic, centralized, and legal-rationalistic governmental
forms predominatating in Western Europe and America.
Born in 1821 Dostoevsky lived to experience first-hand both the reforms and the
intermittent periods of government-sponsored suppression. As a young man he was drawn
to the

ideas

of socialists like Vissarion Belinsky, an influential literary critic, as well as

to the ideas of revolutionaries like Nikolay Speshnev.

It was his association with

Speshnev's "secret circle" of radical agitators that eventually led to Dostoevsky's arrest
and subsequent mock execution in 1849 (Frank 290). But rather than creating a hardened
revolutionary out of him, his four years of hard labor in Siberia only encouraged the
further development of his basically conservative nature.

By the time of his death in

1881, Dostoevsky deplored all political and philosophical movements that criticized the
tsar,

Russia, or the Orthodox Church, aligning

Slavophiles and other conservative critics.

himself with the Native

Soilers,

Reacting against those who attempted to push

Russia into the modern age, various members of the aristocracy and intelligentsia who,
like Dostoevsky, felt threatened by many of the changes that were taking place, formed a
philosophical movement known as Slavophilism. Dedicated to opposing both modernization
and Westernization (the two terms, for most Russians, were interchangeable), the
Slavophiles rallied under the banner of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality." They
openly denounced the "decadent West," warning Russia of the hazards of adopting the
West's love of promoting individualism over communalism, capitalism over agrarianism,
and the State over the Church (Dmytryshyn 18).

Western Europe, the Slavophiles

believed, exerted undue political influence throughout the world, just as it exerted undue
artistic and intellectual influence.

Part of the impulse behind Slavophilism stemmed from

the desire to encourage the development of purely "Russian" political, artistic, and
philosophical ideals (Frank 214).
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No doubt speaking for many Slavophiles, Dostoevsky describes his impressions of
Western culture after a visit to London:

Everything here, apparently, stubbornly insists upon its own way and
exists in its own fashion, and apparently, does not harm anything else.
Yet, at the same time, here too [is] the same stubborn, obscure and by
now chronic struggle, the struggle unto death between the whole Western
world's individualistic bent and the necessity to live together at least in
some form ... (Notes from the Underground and The Grand Inquisitor
181).

The Western personality insists on the rights of the individual first and those of society
second.

But in Dostoevsky's opinion, as in the opinion of many other Slavophiles, the

greatest human achievement lay in sacrificing one's own needs and desires for the benefit
and advancement of all.
me,"

he

exclaims,

In a later essay he further explains his position:

"voluntary,

completely

conscious

and

totally

"Understand

unconstrained

self-sacrifice for the benefit of all is, in my opinion, a token of the greatest achievement
of individuality, of its greatest power, its greatest self-control, the greatest freedom of
its own will" (184).

If each person aspired to and attained such heights of self-sacrifice,

then there would be no need to be so obsessed with individual rights, for no one would
infringe upon the rights of another and true brotherhood and harmony would be achieved.
A brotherhood based on sentiment was, according to Dostoevsky, more realistic than the
artificial and enforced brotherhood the socialists sought to create. He understood,
however, that given human nature neither form of brotherhood would ever likely be
achieved on this earth (187).

Nevertheless, he shared

the Slavophile belief that Russia

and the Orthodox Church offered the best hope on earth for achieving world-wide
happiness and Christian harmony.

Such harmony would never be achieved as long as

Russia continued to repeat the mistakes made by the West.
Like O'Connor's South, then, Dostoevsky's Russia maintained a long-standing
conservative tradition that often questioned the value of "Progress" and modernization.
Slavophilism

was

merely

the philosophical and

intellectual

expression of a sentiment

widely felt in nineteenth-century Russia among the peasantry and nobility alike (Dowler
4). The peasantry generally accepted the status quo, supporting both the power of the tsar
and the Orthodox Church. The Church was highly vocal in its protests against
westernization

and

secularization

and

eagerly played

upon

the peasantry's inborn
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suspicion of foreign influence and its threat to their traditions.

The monarchy also

enjoyed general support among the Russian people, who firmly believed in the concept of a
just and benevolent tsar as the most desirable form of government (Dowier 4).

Those

among the noble classes and the intelligentsia who were in favor of westernization and
full-scale modernization were actually few in number (Dmytryshyn 15).

Nevertheless,

their influence steadily increased throughout the nineteeth century, contributing to the
conservative backlash that resulted in the Slavophile movement.

Like their counterparts

in the nineteenth-century American South, the Slavophiles promoted the Russian agrarian
tradition, praising the national heritage it represented.

Industrialization, they warned,

would only encourage a competitive individualism through which relations between
neighbors would be based not on sentiment and commonality but on contractual bonds
enforced by a rational system of law and commerce (Dowier 8-9).

Western-style

industrialization, the Slavophiles believed, promoted a rampant materialism that, in
Dostoevsky's

words,

"must certainly

lead to universal corruption " (qtd. in Menu: 53).

Similarly, the Western fascination with science had already lead, in Dostoevsky's opinion,
to a spiritual neglect that would ultimately result in the decline of religion and the death of
the human soul.
Dostoevsky was disturbed by the speed with which his native land seemed to embrace
modernization, and like O'Connor, much of his work was written as a warning to those who
sought to abandon their traditional past and adopt a world-view embracing the wonders of
mankind over those of God. He lived during an age characterized by tremendous change and
by a wide-spread questioning of age-oid values.

"Dostoevsky," writes critic Alex De

Jonge, "echoes the issues, traumas and psychological stresses of his epoch with an insight
and breadth of vision that are virtually unique" (1). He was particularly concerned with
responding to the Utilitarian ideas of philosophers like John Stuart Mill and to the
Nihilism of Russian critics like D. Pisarev.

It was the tendency of modernists like Mill

and Pisarev to believe the world could, through logic and reason, be made nearly perfect,
and that it was acceptable and necessary to sever all ties with the past, that Doestoevsky
deplored

(Jones,

Underground
the

Introduction,

New

Essays

on

Dostoevsky 42). Notes

From the

was written, on one level, as an anti-Utilitarian diatrabe meant to reveal

inner-workings of a man

whose

life contradicts the

fundamental

Utilitarian

assumption that people will naturally act according to their own best interest, and that if
everyone were permitted to do so, the world would be a harmonious place (Jones,
Introduction, New Essavs on Dostoevsky 48-49).
testimony to the proposition that,

The Underground Man stands as

self-interest aside, there exist certain people who will
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"suddenly for no reason at all... say to us all: 'What do you think, gentlemen, hadn't we
better kick over all that rationalism at one blow, scatter it to the winds, just to send these
logarithms to the devil, and to let us live once more according to our own foolish will!'"
(Notes from the Underground and The Grand Inquisitor 23). And such people, according to
the Underground Man, will always find a loyal and dedicated following, for "self-interest"
is of little importance when it conflicts in any way with the human impulse to act freely,
no matter what the consequences of those actions might be.
Crime and Punishment, in a similar vein, was meant in part to illustrate the futility
of certain ideas currently being promoted by the Nihilists, who argued that traditional
concepts of morality should be discarded in favor of a more progressive viewpoint based on
scientific rationalism

and socialism

(Dmytryshyn 22). There exist certain people,

claimed the Nihilists, who through the sheer power of their will and intellect are above
the laws of conventional morality and are thus permitted, indeed bound, to use whatever
means available to them to destroy every obstacle in their path standing in the way of
creating a better future for mankind.

As Raskolnikov explains it, the '"extraordinary man

has a right-- not an officially sanctioned right, of course, to permit his conscience to step
over certain obstacles, but only if it is absolutely necessary for the fulfillment of his idea
on which quite possiby the welfare of all mankind may depend"' (Crime and Punishment
276).

Imagining himself such an "extraordinary" man, Raskolnikov murders the old

pawnbroker woman with the idea that he will use her riches to benefit himself and his
family, and that he will be doing the world a service by ridding it of a "louse" who has done
nothing but take advantage of those around her.

He finds himself, however, utterly

incapable of committing the crime in a calm and rational manner and comes close to being
apprehended at the scene. Later, after he has returned safely home, he becomes haunted by
guilt and sickness and has to fight the urge to confess his crime to the police. He finally
realizes he is not the "extraordinary" man he hopes to be and that the crime he has
committed is petty and base and has done nothing at all to benefit humanity. Thus
Raskolnikov is intended to illustrate the futility of attempting to live according to the
dictates of abstract philosophies based on rationalism and utilitarianism.

His inability to

overstep the laws of conventional morality and commit the crime in a rational, logical
manner testifies to the power of a higher law, one that is sanctioned by God and that may
be violated only under penalty of great suffering.
It is his persistent emphasis on the need to live according to the Word of God that
constitutes the philosophical core of Dostoevsky's work.
might

be

termed a "Christian

existentialist"

Like O'Connor, he employs what

framework.

Recognizing the spiritual
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alienation resulting from the process of modernization, he argues that to counteract this
alienation one must maintain faith at all costs. He was at the same time, however, keenly
aware of the attractions of a philosophy that denies the existence of a higher power,
replacing the concept of God with that of the Man-god, the deified individual who alone is
responsible for his own existence (Frank 198).

Indeed,

the various characters who

embody this idea -- the Underground Man, Raskolnikov, and Ivan -

are so vividly

sketched they have led many critics to conclude that Dostoevsky embraced the philosophies
put forth by his "negative" heroes.

Yet in the final analysis his novels are intended to

illustrate both the chaos and spiritual suffering that result from such beliefs, as well as
the need for faith in God. Even Notes from the Underground, which stands out among his
novels as one of the few that does not make a direct appeal for Christianity, was originally
meant to contain a passage on faith that the censors deleted from the texts. This situation
left Dostoevsky exasperated, as he wrote to his brother Michael shortly after the novel's
first printing: "Those swinish censors left in the passages where

I railed at everything

and pretended to blaspheme, but they delete the passages where I deduced from all this the
necessity of faith and Christ.

What are they doing, those censors?" (Notes From the

Underground and The Grand Inquisitor 195). Like O'Connor, he shares many of the ideas
and values common to existentialism, believing that the modern world's devotion to a
scientific rationalism denying the importance of the spiritual will necessarily lead to
alienation and despair.

And like Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky finally concludes that in order

to escape this existential despair one must finally make that "blind leap of faith” and learn
to accept a God whose existence can never be proven (Frank 198).
A.D. Menu summarizes the Christian exitentialist viewpoint to which both O'Connor
and Dostoevsky adhere:

Man is God's creation, God's creature; he properly belongs to God, but he
is estranged from God in fact by the corruption of Original Sin, and sin
destroys this belonging-to-God relationship.... To escape from total
despair, man must learn first of all to accept himself for what he is -- a
finite creature, struggling courageously for that faith in divine love
which

alone

can

lift the

human

spirit

beyond

the

meaningless

transitoriness of mere existence -- to the meaningful and purposive
contemplation of ultimate redemption

(22-23).

Both writers believe that the modern world is misdirecting

its efforts;

rather than
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struggling to solve the mysteries of the natural world through science or create perfection
through the use of technology, humanity should instead accept its limitations in the
material world and concentrate its efforts toward achieving spiritual salvation.

Essential

to salvation is the acceptance of God's love and grace, which may only be achieved by
adhering to certain religious precepts.

For O'Connor, salvation is possible only through

participating in the sacramental life of the Catholic Church.

For Dostoevsky, this

salvation may be achieved only through membership in the Russian Orthodox Church; he
in fact derides the Catholic Church as an authoritarian institution that poses a grave threat
to the religious freedom of humanity the world over.

To him the Catholic doctrines of

papal authority and apostolic succession deny humanity the religious freedom Christ
granted

(Matlaw xxii).

O'Connor, on the other hand, firmly believes in the notion of

papal authority and accepts the words of Church authorities as having come directly from
Christ Himself; to her the Pope is Christ's representitive on earth
Despite the theological differences between Catholicism

and

(L etters 307).

Russian Orthodoxy,

the

two faiths nevertheless share many of the same fundamental principles -- insistence upon
the mysteries of faith, on the need for participation in the sacramental life, and on the
existence of an unbending and eternal code of morality (Fouyas 69).

The two religions

also share in common a ceremonial emphasis on symbol and ritual that "modernist"
Protestant sects view as being both frivolous and idolatrous (Bainton 83).

So too do both

religions view themselves as being the guardians of the true Christian tradition as handed
down by Peter and the Apostles (Fouyas 123). Thus O'Connor and Dostoevsky each embrace
a religion considering itself to be the sole protector of the "Holy Tradition" against the
innovations encouraged by modern Protestantism and secular humanism (Fouyas 163).
Such a religious orientation, focusing as it does on traditional orthodox Christianity,
strongly encouraged the antimodernist impulses of both writers.
In order to create a fictional illustration of the chaos and suffering they believe to
have resulted from the modern world's devotion to secularism, O'Connor and Dostoevsky
employ highly similar literary techniques.

First, they each make extensive use of ironic

humor, a technique used to illustrate the essential absurdity and ridiculousness of human
existence without God. Second, both writers create a gallery of "double" characters meant
to mimic in a distorted but revealing form the worst impulses of the protagonists.

And

finally, they rely heavily on the use of "epiphanic" scenes as a means of illustrating God's
grace in action, revealing Itself to the protagonist through the form of a vision, dream, or
through some catastrophic experience.

This strong emphasis on the importance of

religious experience, however, does not undermine the potency of the message behind such
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irreverent and blasphemous characters as the Misfit and the Underground Man.

Though

they are writers with an explicitly Christian orientation, O'Connor and Dostoevsky
nevertheless manage to endow unsympathetic and "negative" characters with a realism and
legitimacy that some have viewed as brutally un-Christian (Gibson 67).

But only in

creating a powerful and realistic image of a world at its most godless do they believe it is
possible to reveal the absolute and urgent need for accepting God's grace.

O'Connor's first novel, Wise Blood, is the story of a man who makes every attempt to
embrace the godlessness of the modern world.

In her introduction to the novel on the

occasion of its second printing, O'Connor writes, "it is a comic novel about a Christian
malgre lui , and as such, very serious, for all comic novels that are any good must be
about matters of life and death" (2). To her, comedy is useful only insofar as it serves to
underscore the serious nature of her characters' various attempts to avoid worldly
temptations in their quest for spiritual salvation (Martin 10).

Her use of comedy, then,

is never merely to entertain but is always used for a purpose. This form of "serious
comedy" is more aptly termed "grotesque," a term frequently applied to O'Connor's work
to describe the repeated use of characters or situations that are at once comical and
horrifying (Walters 30).
Perhaps no character anywhere better exemplifies the grotesque than Enoch Emery,
Haze's sidekick in Wise Blood. His appearance, his demeanor, the manner by which he
conducts himself -

essentially everything about Enoch is ridiculous.

To Haze he

resembles "a friendly hound dog with light mange," and like a hound dog Enoch happily
trails after him, oblivious to the fact that Haze obviously does not want the boy's company
(Three By Flannery O'Connor 21). Indeed, few people do desire his company - even his
father, according to Enoch's own testimony, "traded" him away to a welfare woman. Alone
in the world, he attempts to establish a friendship with Haze, who is too preoccupied with
his spiritual dilemmas to respond to the boy's efforts.

Enoch, however, is willing to do

whatever is necessary to gain Haze's favor, and it is in his attempt to locate Haze's
so-called "new jesus" that Enoch reveals his truly grotesque nature.

His quest for the

mummified idol involves an elaborate ritual built around, among other things, gilding a
washstand cabinet to provide the "new jesus" with an appropriate altar; hiding in the
bushes at the pool to watch the

women sunbathe; taking a trip to the zoo to insult the

animals with curses; and finally, stopping off at the local soda fountain to flirt with the
drunken waitress who is fond of referring to him as a "puss-marked bastard." All of these
activities are dictated by Enoch's "wise blood," which has propelled him on an absurd

25

journey finally culminating in the humiliating experience of enduring insult at the hands
of Gonga, the movie-star gorilla who tells him to go to hell.

Enoch's gullible faith in his

"wise blood," his superstitious fear of the portraits that hang on his wall, his image of
himself as a flirtatious ladies' man with whom the waitress at the soda fountain must
certainly be in love -

these and other characteristics emphasize his comical nature.

These comic qualities, however, act as a counterpoint to the essentially serious nature
behind Enoch's character, a nature poignantly revealed in his intense need to belong, to
find a place for himself in the world.
he really does not belong -

His journey ends in the horrifying realization that

the only happiness he will ever find is in the guise of a

gorilla, as the person underneath Gonga’s movie-star suit.

Enoch's situation, juxtaposing

as it does the ridiculous with the tragic, is indeed grotesque.
But as Dorothy Walters notes, the grotesque is never without a moral purpose (30).
Enoch's purpose is to parallel in comic form Haze's own, more profound, search for
meaning in his relationship to God and for his place in God's world (Driskal and Brittain
39). Propelled as he is by his "blood's" animal instinct, Enoch can only find meaning
through debasing himself in the guise of a gorilla.

His tragedy is that he must deny the

spirit in favor of the flesh in order to find his place in the world (Driskal and Brittain
52). Haze, conversely, becomes so obsessed with his spiritual salvation that he denies the
needs of the flesh, practicing an extreme form of acseticism ultimately leading to his
death. Enoch and Haze represent opposing sides of the same dialectical problem, and
neither character is possible without the other.
written Wise Blood without Enoch.
353).

O'Connor concludes, "I couldn't have

It would have been impossible mechanically" (Letters

His character, though humorous and highly entertaining, serves to underscore an

idea which is essential to the central meaning of the novel: both the realm of the flesh and
the realm of the spirit must be integrated in order to form one whole individual.

To

consider the two spheres separate is a modern form of Manicheanism which results, in
O'Connor's words, in the "disjunction between sensibility and belief..." (Mystery and
Manners 33). True understanding of God may only be achieved through harnessing both
the cerebral as well as the earthly aspects of one's own nature.
Fyodor Karamozov, the "old buffoon" of The Brothers Karamozov. serves much the
same purpose as Enoch in Wise Blood by parodying in humorous form the ideas of his son
Ivan. Most critics have tended to concentrate on the more serious aspects of Dostoevsky's
work, downplaying the role that comedy plays in his fiction.

But like O'Connor, he uses

comedy as a vehicle for highlighting the serious nature of the philosophical and spiritual
dilemmas his characters face.

Dostoevsky employs "scandal scenes" in the way that
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O'Connor uses the grotesque, as a means of, in the words of Malcolm Jones, "overturning
conventional norms and expectations [through] the juxtaposition of opposites," creating
episodes during which characters engage in the most extreme, outrageous, and often
obscene forms of behavior possible (Introduction, New Essavs on Dostoevsky 6). These
scandal scenes run the gamut from the comic to the tragic, from the buffoonery of old
Fyodor at the monastery to the utter shamelessness of the Underground Man's conduct at
Zverkov's farewell dinner (Jones, Dostoevsky: The Novel of Discord

40).

What these

episodes share in common is that they are designed to alert the reader, either through
humor or shock, to the more serious questions and conflicts lurking just beneath the
surface.
Fyodor's conduct at the monastery at first glance seems only designed to entertain the
reader, who cannot help but laugh at the old man's attempts to gain the "sacred elder's"
esteem.

His made-up story about Diderot's christening at the Court of Catherine the

Great, his attempt at honoring Zossima with the obscene tribute, "’Blessed be the womb
that bare thee, and the paps that gave thee suck - the paps especially,"' his insistence on
provoking Miusov by nicknaming him Von Sohn, after a man who was killed in a brothelall are extremely inappropriate forms of conduct for visitors at the monastery (T h e
Brothers Karamozov 47). It is this sense of his extreme inappropriateness that makes
Fyodor such a humorous character (Jones, Dostoevsky: The Novel of Discord 42). Like
Enoch, however, the old man's function is not merely to entertain but to illustrate as well.
Although the "old buffoon's" antics

are entertaining to the reader, the narrator points out

that for the characters involved, Fyodor's conduct is a source of acute embarrassment and
humiliation.

Indeed, his conduct is so "incredible," the narrator assures us, that as far as

anyone can tell it is entirely unprecedented in the history of the monastery. Even the most
adament "freethinkers" and atheists have visited the monks with a feeling of respect and
veneration and an "eager desire to decide some spiritual problem or crisis" (46).
Alyosha, for his part, is so shamed by his father's display that he is close to tears, resting
his hopes on Ivan, the only person who has ever been able to exert any sort of restraining
influence on the old man.

But Ivan "sat now quite unmoved, with downcast eyes,

apparently waiting with interest to see how it would end, as though he had nothing to do
with

it" (46).
Ivan's conduct throughout the scene is crucial, for not only does it pave the way for

the old man's unrestrained buffoonery to run its course, but it also illustrates the
potentially disastrous consequences of Ivan's maxim that if there is no God, then "All is
permitted."

The old man's conduct provides an outwardly humorous, though essentially
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serious, illustration of the sort of chaos that may arise when such an idea is put into
action. The scene serves as well as a somewhat lighthearted foreshadowing of the deadly
results of this amoral philosophy, when Fyodor is finally murdered by Smerdyakov, who
takes Ivan's maxim all too seriously.

Had Ivan attempted to understand Zossima's

assertion that "All are responsible for all," then he would have understood as well his
moral obligation to put a stop to the scene at the monastery, just as he would later have
understood

his responsibility in the development of Sm erdyakov's

nihilistic and

destructive ideas.
The old man, like Enoch, is a humorous illustration of a human being who has lost
touch with God and who fruitlessly and comically attempts to find some sort of meaning in
life. Ivan and Haze, on the other hand, embody the more serious consequences that result
from rejecting God and His moral order.

Both O'Connor and Dostoevsky have created a

number of characters, humorous or otherwise, who act as "doubles" of the protagonist,
revealing to them aspects of their own personalities they would often prefer to forget
(Asals 69).

This technique is highly visible throughout The Violent Bear It Away, where

nearly every character in some way acts as a reflection of another (Asals 169).

Young

Tarwater is mirrored in both the character of his "friend,” the voice who offers him
encouragement in his attempt to shun God, and in Rayber, his atheistic uncle who tries to
make the boy over in his own image.

The friendly stranger, whom Tarwater hears but

rarely sees, first appears as the boy is burying the old prophet according to his explicit
instructions.

His "friend" tempts Tarwater away from his mission, reinforcing his doubts

about the old man's teachings.

"That schoolteacher," his "friend" explains, "wouldn't

consider for a minute that on the last day all the bodies marked by crosses will be
gathered.

In the rest of the world they do things different than what you been taught"

(Three By Flannery O ’Connor
the old man?

138). Why not just go ahead, the voice asks, and cremate

"And lemme ast you this," his "friend" offers. "What's God going to do with

sailors drowned at sea that the fish have et and the fish that et them et by other fish and
they et by yet others?" (138).

Using theories based on relativistic and rationalist

systems of thought, the friendly stranger, reflecting the boy's own worst impulses,
convinces Tarwater to disobey the old man's request for a proper Christian burial.
Some critics, misunderstanding O'Connor's intent, have interpreted Tarwater's
"friend" as being a product of the boy's imagination, rather than a separate character
(Driskall and Brittain 138).
himself -- who to her is a

O'Connor, however, intends the voice to be that of the Devil
literal being readers should easily be able to identify.

"My

Devil has a name, a history and a definite plan," she explains. "His name is Lucifer, he's a
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fallen angel, his sin is pride, and his aim is the destruction of the Divine plan" (Letters
456). This same Devil appears again to Tarwater as he makes his way back to Powderhead
after having simultaneously drowned and baptized Bishop. Wearing a panama hat like that
of his "friend," the Devil offers the boy a ride, drugs him with liquor and marijuana, and
rapes him.

Tarwater is only vaguely aware of the resemblance between his "friend" and

the man who offers him a ride, but the reader is meant to understand that the two are
personifications of the same being, both with the same plan in mind. Tarwater's "friend"
mimics the boy's doubts about his uncle in order to reveal, through almost comical
exaggeration, the essential uselessness of a creed that views evil as a relative concept,
refusing to accept anything that cannot be rationally proven.

Similarly, the "stranger"

forces the boy to endure the painful physical consequences of rejecting his uncle's
warnings about the dangers and temptations of the world, in order to reinforce Tarwater's
awareness of the evil and chaos lurking within the godless creed he hopes to embrace.
It is only after his

encounter with the "stranger" that he finally comes to understand

the futility of his desire to blaspheme and learns to accept his part in carrying on his
uncle's prophetic mission.

As a character who is able to reveal to Tarwater the

uselessness as well as the utter sinfulness of his ideas, the Devil, in his various guises,
plays a vital role.
"In general," O'Connor writes, "the Devil can always be a subject for my kind of
comedy one way or another.

I suppose this is because he is always accomplishing ends

other than his own" (Letters 367).

The Devil of The Violent Bear It Awav manages to

provoke Tarwater into the realization that he must accept his prophetic mission as a man
of God. But the Devil is not alone in his influence. Rayber, the boy's schoolteacher uncle,
provides yet another mirror image of Tarwater's own ideas at their worst (Asals 162).
The physical similarities between the two are apparent from the start, and to Rayber at
least, are slightly unsettling. "When Rayber had first opened the door in the middle of the
night and had seen Tarwater's face -- white, drawn by some unfathomable hunger and
pride -- he had remained for an instant frozen before what might have been a mirror
thrust toward him in a nightmare" (184). Not only do they resemble each other
physically, but Rayber and Tarwater share many of the same opinions about the old man as
well. Like his nephew, Rayber was kidnapped as a child and taken to Powderhead, where
the old prophet preached the Truth to him, cautioning the young boy to prepare his soul
for salvation or suffer eternal damnation.

Rayber's parents quickly saved him from the

old man's clutches, but the experience nevertheless left a strong impression on the boy. It
was a number of years before he was finally able to "cure" himself of his "affliction" and
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come to accept the real truth, which is that faith in God is merely the result of childish
insecurity and neurosis.
man, however.

Tarwater was not so fortunate in his experiences with the old

He was kept at Powderhead long enough for the old prophet's influence to

permeate his entire being, and it is Rayber's goal to cure his nephew in the same way he
cured himself.

Although Tarwater remains suspicious of Rayber and his intentions, his

uncle's atheistic and rationalist views nonetheless hold a certain attraction for the boy. He
insists that he does not want to baptize Bishop, that he no longer believes anything the old
man taught him, and that he now wants to go to church only so that he can spit on it.
Tarwater makes every attempt to embrace Rayber's way of life; to him Rayber represents
all he would like to become, if only he can escape the old man's grasp.
Even after he has given in to his ''compulsions" and baptized Bishop, Tarwater
continues to resist the old man, emphasizing to himself the fact that he was able to murder
the boy.

Thinking like Rayber, he at first sees the drowning as evidence of having been

"cured." Leaving the city and heading back to Powderhead, he feels as though he is
returning a free man, "tried in the fire of his refusal, with all the old man's fancies burnt
out of him, with all the old man's madness smothered for good, so that there was never any
chance it would break out in him" (254).

Only after his pivotal encounter with the Devil

does he realize how blind he has been.
Despite his many protests to the contrary, however, Tarwater never could fully
embrace Rayber's viewpoint, suspicious as he is of the man's reliance on a piece of
machinery in order to hear, his insistence on performing tests and his attempts to reduce
human behavior to the level of equation and rational deduction.

Seeing his own doubts

about God reflected back to him in the person of his bespectacled schoolteacher uncle,
Tarwater cannot help but feel somewhat repulsed.

From the boy's perspective, Rayber

represents pure intellect in its worst form, devoid of the ability to take action:

'I ain't like you. All you can do is think what you would have done if you
had done it. Not me, I can do it. I can act.' He was looking at his uncle now
with a completely fresh contempt. 'It's nothing about me like you,' he said
(2 3 8 ).

However much he may be attracted to his uncle's atheism, Tarwater nevertheless remains
unable to overcome his inbred contempt of

Rayber's schoolteacher intellectualism, and it

is the boy's determination not to be made over in his uncle’s image that contributes to his
final acceptance of God's plan.
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The sense of revulsion that arises out of seeing one's own worst impulses reflected in
another most often

provokes characters to reject their "doubles" and all they represent.

Like Tarwater, Raskolnikov, the protagonist of Crime and Punishment, experiences the
horror of seeing his ideas mirrored back to him by other characters, and like Tarwater,
he too experiences a sense of revulsion and contempt that ultimately leads to his own
salvation.

Perhaps the most humorous, though no less repulsive, double Raskolnikov

encounters is Luzhin, his sister's fiance.

Luzhin's comic nature stems from the fact that

he is possessed by an extreme arrogance and inflated sense of his own importance,
offending nearly everyone he meets. Yet he remains oblivious, convinced he is a most
charming and intelligent man.

Although seemingly harmless, Luzhin has a a dark and

dangerous side to his nature, stemming from his selfishness and his complete lack of
regard for others. He espouses a creed that, according to the laws of science and
utilitarianism, is based entirely on self-interest.

Fancying himself a man who is truly in

touch with the "younger generation," he attempts to explain his views to Raskolnikov and
his friends:

'As the Russian proverb has it, "If you run after two hares, you won't
catch one."

But

science

else, for everything

tells

us,

"Love

yourself

before

everyone

in the world is based on self-interest..." And

economic truth adds that the more successfully private business is run...
the more solid are the foundations of our social life and the greater is the
general well-being.

Which means that by acquiring wealth exclusively

and only for myself, I'm by that very fact acquiring as it were, for
everybody and helping to bring about a state of affairs in which my
neighbor will get something better than a torn coat, and that not through
the private charity of a few, but as the result of the higher standard of
living for all'

(167).

Luzhin's standard of conduct differs only by degree from Raskolnikov's own ideas
regarding the existence of certain "extraordinary" men for whom conventional codes of
morality mean nothing.

In his article on the subject, Raskolnikov argues that these

"extraordinary" men are often compelled to overstep moral boundaries in order to lead the
rest of the "ordinary" world toward a better future.

All great leaders, he argues, have

also been ruthless murderers, as it is often necessary to spill blood in order to achieve
great ends.

Both Raskolnikov and Luzhin justify these ideas with the rationalization that
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they are only logical and, furthermore, they help to promote the general welfare of all
mankind.

Raskolnikov, recognizing the similarity between the two perspectives, remarks

to a shocked and offended Luzhin, '"Well, if the principles you've just been advocating are
pushed to their logical conclusion, you'll soon be justifying murder'" (170).
However much he may recognize the philosophical similarities between himself and
Luzhin, Raskolnikov nevertheless remains contemptuous of the man, for he understands
that Luzhin's cold-blooded principles are to be applied in his relationship with Dunya,
Raskolnikov's sister.

Hoping to create an advantage for himself, Luzhin is pleased at the

prospect of acquiring a poverty-stricken wife who will likely be forever grateful to him
for his generosity in marrying someone who has no dowry.

According to his utilitarian

principles, any girl who is poor will naturally feel indebted to any man who will take her,
and this indebtedness will be a source of great power to her future husband:

Here he had something much more than anything he had imagined in his
wildest

dreams: here was a proud girl, a girl of character, education and

mental and spiritual development superior to his own (he felt that), and
this human

being would be slavishly grateful to him all her life for his

disinterested action; she would humbly and reverently acknowledge him
as her lord and master, and he would have her entirely in his power!
(3 2 3 ).

Not only would marriage to Dunya, in Luzhin's eyes, be a source of power,
would it be a means of furthering his social position.

but so too

A beautiful, intelligent, and virtuous

woman could only enhance his standing in society; influential people would naturally be
attracted to him with someone like Dunya as his wife.

Luzhin does not undertake any

action, even one as intimate as marriage, without first assuring that his interests are
being furthered and that he will somehow benefit.
When Raskolnikov sees this selfish principle applied to his own sister, he naturally
feels repulsed, much the same way he feels when he encounters a young, half-naked, and
drunk girl walking alone in the streets, stalked by a man who obviously intends to take
advantage of her vulnerable state.

When he first spots the girl he attempts to interfere on

her behalf, calling the attention of a nearby police officer.

But soon Raskolnikov feels

disgusted and somewhat embarrassed by his altruistic impulses, believing them to be
useless and irrational.
himself.

"Let them devour each other alive for all I care," he declares to

"What business is it of mine?"

(68).

Then,

however,

it slowly dawns on him
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that the girl could very well have been his own sister:

It's essential, they say, that such a percentage should every year go -that way ~ to the devil - it’s essential so that the others should be kept
fresh and healthy and not interfered with... So soothing.

Scientific.

All

you do is say 'percentage' and all your worries are over... And what if
Dunya should somehow or other find herself among the percentage? If not
that, then another? (69).

When Raskolnikov is able to personalize theories that, like his own, require a certain
"percentage" of people to be sacrificed so that the general good might be promoted, he
begins to understand the fundamental immorality behind his own proposal to kill the old
pawnbroker.
Although Raskolnikov is disgusted when he hears theories like his own stemming
from the mouth of a man as unattractive and base as Luzhin, he nevertheless continues to
justify his act of murder to himself, and later to Sonia as well.

It is not until another,

more sinister, double appears that Raskolnikov truly begins to see the grave moral error
he has committed in assuming murder may somehow be justified.

This second double

appears in the character of Svidrigaylov, Dunya's former employer. Luzhin, though he too
may threaten Dunya’s future happiness with his selfish desire to tyrannize her, pales in
comparison to Svidrigaylov, a man whose utterly nihilistic and evil ways threaten Dunya's
very soul.

For Svidrigaylov has carried Luzhin's principle of self-interest beyond all

limits, declaring that there is no moral order and therefore, to use Ivan's words, "All is
permitted." Having adopted this attitude, Svidrigaylov lives a life of idle pleasure and
cruelty, passing away his time gambling, drinking, and pursuing young girls. His
obsession with Dunya provoked him to murder his wife, an act to which he confesses quite
openly.

But in his view murder is an insignificant act; indeed, he has been implicated in

the deaths of two of his servants, yet he tells Raskolnikov his conscience is clear.
Svidrigaylov has become so jaded over the years that his only remaining pleasures are in
the pursuit of cruelty and vice.

In fact, he does not really consider anything he does to be

"vice," per se; he believes that if examined "without prejudice,"

that is, without moral

judgement, then his life will be viewed as quite natural and quite normal. He has not taken
"advantage"

of any of the poverty-stricken, defenseless young girls who have sought

employment in his home over the years.

Rather, he has merely been following the natural

course of events that occur when a healthy, full-blooded man finds himself attracted to a
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beautiful young woman.

In fact, in Svidrigaylov's opinion, if anyone was victimized by his

affair with Dunya, it is himself, as he is the one who was painfully rejected by the woman
he so passionately desired.

He prefers, however, not to think of life in moral terms but

rather to simply accept it in all of its moral ambiguities.

For death, he explains to

Raskolnikov, is likely no better than life:

'We're always thinking of eternity as an idea that cannot be understood,
something immense.

By why must it be? What if, instead of all this, you

suddenly just find a little room there, something

like the village

bath-house, grimy, and spiders in every corner, and that's all eternity
is?'

(305).

Svidrigaylov is a man who,

like Raskolnikov, has concluded that traditional morality is an

obsolete concept that should be discarded for a more "progressive," more "natural" point
of view.

This conclusion, though it has allowed him to live a life of utter decadence, has

left Svidrigaylov a cynical, unfeeling man, one who sees nothing but vulgarity and
emptiness wherever he looks.
Unlike Svidrigaylov, Raskolnikov believes that the laws of morality may only be
suspended for a certain few, and then only when the general welfare of humanity is being
promoted.

But Svidrigaylov sees no purpose in exempting only a few, and he recognizes

the futility of attempting to determine just who these "extraordinary" individuals might
be.

If morality does not apply to a few select individuals, then there is no reason why it

should apply to anyone at all.

Thus Svidrigaylov's moral philosophy does hold a certain

logic Raskolnikov cannot refute, and though he continues to feel repulsed, he nevertheless
listens attentively to what his "double" has to say about life and morality.

Svidrigaylov

claims, for example, to find a certain integrity in the pursuit of "vice" and "sin," for only
through these pursuits is he able to experience genuine feeling and desire:

'Let’s say it is vice.

There is something permanent in this vice;

something that is founded on nature and not subject to the whims of fancy;
something that sets it on fire and that you won't perhaps be able to put out
for a long time, even with years.
occupation, isn't it?'

You must agree it's sort of an

(482).

Were it not for vice, he concludes, he would have no other choice but to "blow his brains
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out." Life has simply lost all meaning for Svidrigaylov, and his character offers
Raskolnikov a vivid picture of what he has to look forward to, should he too lose his ability
to value life.
Svidrigaylov, in short, is the living embodiment of Raskolnikov's ideas carried to
their logical conclusion.

During one of their "chance" encounters, Svidrigaylov entertains

Raskolnikov with strories from his past.

Highly amused at his shock upon hearing

tales

of murder and seduction, Svidrigaylov laughlingly points out that the two men are really
just "birds of a feather.

Look at the Schiller!'"

that's where virtue has taken up her abode!

he taunts.

"'A regular Schiller!

So

Do you know, I think I'll go on telling you

these stories just for the sake of hearing your fantastic protestations. Delightful!"'
Raskolnikov, disgusted and ashamed, is unable to defend himself, for he is beginning to
understand that the murder he has committed has done no more to promote the cause of
progress than have the various "sins" Svidrigaylov has committed.

"'Do you suppose I

don't know how ridiculous I look at this moment?"' he replies in exasperation (494).
Raskolnikov is slowly beginning to understand the kinship between

himself and

Svidrigaylov, and after he hears the news that his "double" has indeed "blown his brains
out,"

he

realizes

that

he must choose between life and death.

Knowing he too will be

driven to suicide if he continues to live by a code that refuses to acknowledge the existence
of good and evil and the value of life, Raskolnikov makes the decision to reject Svidrigaylov
and all he represents, finally agreeing to confess his crime to the police.

His confession is

the first step toward his ultimate acceptance of Sonia and the moral and religious tradition
represents: love of God and of the life He has given and an understanding of the need for
suffering, repentence, and the salvation of the soul.
For Raskolnikov, however, salvation does not come easy.
and experiences a terrible nightmare, a vision

Only after he is in prison

of the world in the grip of a deadly virus,

does he come to a final acceptance of humanity's need of God and of the moral code that He
has ordained.

In this terrible dream people who became infected with the virus "at once

became mad and violent." But never before had everyone "considered themselves as wise
and as strong in their pursuit of the truth... " (555).

World-wide chaos and destruction

result, and eventually only a few survivors are left, people who, endowed with the spirit
of God, are immune to the effects of the virus and understand that there exist not many
truths, but only one everlasting Truth.

This dream leaves a profound impression on

Raskolnikov, clearly revealing to him for the first time what would take place in the
world if everyone adopted his ideas. Both O'Connor and Dostoevsky make extensive use of
such "epiphanic" scenes, episodes in which the protagonist is suddenly, and often quite
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rudely, awakened to the Truth. These scenes, in which God often reveals Himself, serve as
illustrations of a viewpoint that stands in direct contrast to the modern tendency to deny
the realm of the spiritual and the supernatural.
Epiphanic scenes proliferate throughout the body of O'Connor's work, from the scene
where Haze's automobile is pushed over the embankment in Wise Blood, to the scene where
Hulga loses her wooden leg to the Bible-thumping shuckster in "Good Country People," to
Tarwater's rape in The Violent Bear It Away.

But perhaps the best-known and most

illustrative of O'Connor's epiphanic scenes takes place in "A Good Man is Hard to Find,"
where the violent circumstances surrounding her death force the once blind Grandmother
to recognize and accept the presence of God's grace. Salvation is offered to her through an
encounter with the Misfit, a gun-toting

nihilist philosopher who bears a distinct

resemblence to Svidrigaylov, Raskolnikov, and Ivan. He has recently escaped from prison,
where

he was serving time for a crime he cannot remember committing. "’I found out the

crime don't matter,"' he explains to the Grandmother. "'You can do one thing or you can do
another, kill a man or take a tire off his car, because sooner or later you'll get punished
for it"' (A Good Man Is Hard to Find 26-27). The Misfit has decided to live a life of crime
because, like many of Dostoevsky's characters, he cannot accept a God whose existence
cannot be proven. His inability to accept religious uncertainty has led him to the
conclusion that beyond death there is most likely absolutely nothing. Thus he finds no
value in life, concluding that if there is nothing beyond the flesh, no spiritual life, then
there is no reason to restrain his criminal impulses. He explains this philosophy to the
Grandmother:

'Jesus was the only One that ever raised the dead... and He shouldn't have
done it.

He thown (sic) everything off balance.

If He did what He said,

then its nothing for you to do but thow (sic) away everything and follow
Him, and if He didn't, then it's nothing for you to do but enjoy the few
minutes you got left the best way you can — by killing somebody or
burning down his house or doing some other meanness to him.

No

pleasure but meanness' (28).

The Misfit has managed to take up the philosophical challenge posed by Svidrigaylov,
Raskolnikov, and Ivan.

Each of them in one way or another is eventually overwhelmed by

the implications of his nihilistic ideas:

Svidrigaylov finds his life so utterly empty and

unfulfilling that he feels compelled to kill himself; Raskolnikov is so haunted by doubt and
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guilt that he bumbles his crime, leaving far too many clues, and is forced to give himself
up and repent; Ivan continues to insist on the validity of his ideas, refusing to acknowledge
his responsibility in his father's death, but he too is so tortured by his increasing sense of
guilt that he contracts a nearly fatal brain disease. The Misfit, on the other hand, simply
accepts the conclusion that if Jesus was a fraud, then there truly is no code of morality by
which one must live.

Thus he indulges himself in the most heinous of crimes with no

apparent feelings of regret or remorse.

He has concluded, with full understanding of the

implications of his idea, that amorality and nothingness are facts of life, and he acts
accordingly.
The Grandmother is naturally horrified when she comes face to face with a man who
is at once so casual and so brutal about the implications of his beliefs. She insists that he
must, underneath his criminal facade, be a truly good man. Begging him to pray for Jesus'
help, she hopes that he will allow the "goodness" in him to work its way into his heart.
'"Jesus!"' the old lady cried. "'You've got good blood! I know you wouldn't shoot a lady! I
know you come from nice people! Pray! Jesus, you ought not to shoot a lady! I'll give you
all the money

I've got"'(28).

Half cursing, half pleading, the Grandmother calls to Jesus

in the vain hope that He may somehow help her.

But here she exhibits no true faith or

understanding, merely a desperate, clinging and utterly selfish hope that will grasp at
anything to save her -- Jesus, her status as a lady, her money.

Indeed, she has from the

beginning been concerned above all with her own safety, pleading with the Misfit only to
spare her life; so preoccupied is she with her own safety that she all but forgets the other
members of her family.
The Grandmother's pleas go entirely unnoticed by the Misfit, who is himself too
preoccupied with his thoughts on Jesus and his own spiritual fate to care about what
happens to the Grandmother. Only after she collapses under the weight of the realization
that she will be shot along with the rest of the family does the Grandmother begin to see
the Misfit in a different light:

'Listen lady,' he said in a high voice, 'if 1 had of been there I would of
known and I wouldn't be like I am now.' His voice seemed about to crack
and the grandmother's head cleared for an instant. She saw the man's face
twisted close to her own as if he were going to cry and she murmered,
'Why you're one of my babies. You’re one of my own children!' She
reached out and touched him on the shoulder (29).
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The grace and presence of God has worked Its way through the Grandmother, who in a
single moment of epiphany suddenly loses all concern for herself, realizing her
responsibility for the Misfit and for all the children of God (Driskell and Brittain 70).
Her response at the moment of her death provides a poigant refutation of all the Misfit
represents, answering his claim that "All is permitted" with Zossima's reminder that, in
the body of Christ, "All are responsible for all."
The Misfit, too, has been touched by grace. As O'Connor explains in one of her letters,
"The Misfit is touched by the Grace that comes through the old lady when she recognizes
him as her child, as she has been touched by the Grace that comes through him in his
particular suffering" (389).

Thus this horrifying scene ending in death and destruction

serves as the catalyst through which God bestows His grace upon those who were once blind
to His ways.

This transformation would never have been possible were it not for the

violent and traumatic circumstances provoking it.

The Misfit himself notes that the

Grandmother '"would of been a good woman... if it had been somebody there to shoot her
ever minute of her life"' (29).

In O'Connor's viewpoint epiphanic moments, moments of

genuine understanding, are possible only under the most traumatic circumstances, for it
takes a force most powerful to awaken those who are imbued with "the poison of the
modern world" (Letters 403).
The theme of spiritual regeneration and awakening is also common throughout the
body of Dostoevsky's work. The characters he considers to be his heroes -- Raskolnikov,
and later, Alyosha -- are those characters who experience moments of true understanding
of the power and love of Christ. Alyosha is a particularly interesting example of one of
Dostoevsky's "reborn" characters, for he is surely at the same time one of the most pious
and devout.

From his early childhood Alyosha has been "a lover of humanity," and in turn

has been loved by nearly everyone who has known him (The Brothers Karamozov 16).
Entering the monastery seems the natural course of action for one as loving and as full of
faith as Alyosha.

Yet, as the narrator notes, the boy's motivation in becoming a monk is

not nearly as simple as it appears; indeed, there is a side to his nature that is keenly
aware of the presence of evil and darkness. "He entered upon this path" according to the
narrator, "because at that time, it alone struck his imagination and presented itself to him
as offering an ideal means of escape for his soul from darkness to light" (25).
then, a dark and even slightly obsessive side to Alyosha's nature.

There is,

As the narrator

explains, "If he had decided that God and immortality did not exist, he would have at once
become an atheist and a socialist," a path that Dostoevsky believes will certainly lead to
spiritual ruin (26).

Like the Misfit, Tarwater, Haze, Raskolnikov, Svidrigaylov, and

Ivan, Alyosha recognizes that the choice
all-or-nothing proposition.

between

belief and

non-belief is an

And like these other characters there is a tiny part of
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Alyosha's being that has the potential to do evil, and in the trilogy Dostoevsky

planned to

write Alyosha was to later undergo great trials during which he abandons faith and, before
he comes to a final and complete understanding of God, leads a life of sin (Jones, The Novel
of Discord 176).
Thus Alyosha's trial of faith after the death of the elder is no easy matter, for his
doubts threaten to disrupt his being at its very core, turning around every belief he has
ever held dear. His test of faith comes under what most would consider to be quite trivial
circumstances. As the narrator notes, however, these circumstances were a matter of the
utmost importance to Alyosha:

I may add here, for myself personally, that I feel it almost repulsive to
recall that event which caused such frivolous agitation and was such a
stumbling block to many, though in reality it was the most natural and
trivial matter.

I should, of course, have omitted all mention of it in my

story, if it had not exerted a very strong influence on the heart and soul
of the chief, though future, hero of my story, Alyosha, forming a crisis
and turning point in his spiritual development, giving a shock to his
intellect, which finally strengthened it for the rest of his life and gave it a
definite aim (396).

This "shocking" event is simply the unexpected and surprisingly rapid decompostion of the
elder Zossima's body. Believing in his saintliness, the people of the town, as well as many
of the monks, assumed that upon his death Zossima's body would have remained "pure" and
"untainted," performing miracles for those who touched it.

When this "proof" of

Zossima's saintliness does not present itself, those of little faith are quick to come forth
with attacks on his character, claiming that this "breath of corruption" from his body is a
sure sign of God's judgement. Alyosha cannot bear to hear Zossima's saintliness questioned
by people so unworthy of him, and here begins his short-lived, but nonetheless
important, "rebellion."

Alyosha simply cannot understand why God has allowed such a

blasphemy to occur:

He could not endure without mortification, without resentment even, that
the holiest of holy men should have been exposed to the jeering and
spiteful mockery of the frivolous crowd so inferior to him... Where is the
finger of Providence?

Why did Providence hide its face 'at the most

critical moment'... as though voluntarily submitting to the blind, dumb,
pitiless laws of nature?

(408)
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Remembering his conversations with Ivan concerning the "unacceptability" of

God's

world, Alyosha grows increasingly resentful of God and begins to lose all concern for the
rules of the monastery.

He rebels in small ways at first, but later decides to go and visit

Grushenka, the most notorious sinner of the town, mistress to both his father and his
brother.

Expecting to find in her a "wicked" person, he visits Grushenka hoping to wallow

in evil and baseness. What he finds instead is a sympathetic and understanding soul, one
who is momentarily able to overcome her "wicked" designs on Alyosha and share in his
grief and anguish over the death of Zossima. Alyosha's meeting with Grushenka acts as the
first step toward his eventual acceptance of God and His plan, no matter how "unseemly"
and

"corrupt" it may seem to be.

He is slowly able to recover from his feelings of grief

and humiliation and begins to accept Zossima's death with a feeling of joy and thankfulness
that provides the emotional climate during which his will experience his moment of
epiphany.
After leaving Grushenka's, he immediately returns to the monastery, where he joins
Father Paissy in his vigil over the body.
Paissy's words, which

Alyosha finds himself mesmerized by Father

are drawn from the Biblical passage regarding Christ's first

miracle at the marriage in Cana of Galilee.

Entering a state of rapture, Alyosha feels

himself drawn to the site of the wedding feast.

There he sees the bride and bridegroom,

their guests, and to his utter surprise and delight, Zossima, who tells the boy of the
"terrible greatness"
guests

and

infinite

to the site of the

awakens from his reverie,

mercy

of

Christ,

who

is forever

drawing

new

feast. Alyosha is overwhelmed with joy, and though he
he vividly remembers the words of Zossima and the beautiful

face of Christ, and he realizes that his soul has been visited so that he may be relieved of
his terrible burden of grief:

But with every instant he felt clearly and, as it were, tangibly, that
something firm and unshakable as that vault of heaven had entered into his
soul. It was as though some idea had seized the sovereignty of his mindand it was for all his life and for ever and ever. He had fallen on the earth
a weak boy, but he rose up a resolute champion, and he knew and felt it
suddenly at the very moment of his ecstasy. And never, never, all his life
long could Alyosha forget that minute (437).

Alyosha has been touched by the grace of God, a force that will instill in him the strength
and perseverence he will need to complete his "sojourn into the world," where he, like
Tarwater, will minister to the children of God (Jones, The Novel of Discord 189).
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In O'Connor's opinion the modern world is largely populated by people who have little
understanding, if any, of God's grace.

She found it difficult, as a Christian writer, to

communicate her orthodox perspective to a modern, secular-minded audience:

The novelist with Christian concerns will find in modern life distortions
which are repugnant to him, and his problem will be to make these appear
as distortions to an audience which is used to seeing them as natural, and
he may well be forced to take ever more violent means to get his vision
across to this hostile

audience (Mystery and Manners 33-34).

O'Connor's violent technique is most often exhibited in the manner by which she resolves
the fates of her protagonists.

Few of them manage to escape death or physical and

emotional trauma, yet those few who do manage to emerge from her stories unscathed are
the least fortunate. To O'Connor, violence is often a positive force, offering the only
opportunities her "blind" characters will ever have to experience and truly recognize
God's grace in action.

Rayber, for example, is spared any physical harm.

He has,

however, been given the opportunity to experience the pain and suffering of Bishop's
death, yet as the narrator notes, he cannot bring himself to feel any grief.

"He stood

waiting for the raging pain, the intolerable hurt that was his due, to begin, so that he could
ignore it, but he continued to feel nothing... and it was not until he realized there would be
no pain that he collapsed" (243). Here Rayber encounters divine grace in the death of his
only son, the boy whom he has so dearly loved and so cruelly rejected; it is the only means
by which a man as blind and as unfeeling as he will ever be able to come to a true
acceptance and understanding of God. The fact that he continues to resist, refusing to allow
himself to experience pain and suffering, assures Rayber's spiritual demise.

O'Connor

notes in one of her letters that she would like for Rayber to have been saved, but she
doubts his ability to love, suffer, and seek forgiveness and redemption (357).

It is only

the characters able to accept their suffering as a sign of God's presence and grace who will
ever manage to redeem themselves and achieve salvation.
Dostoevsky, like O'Connor, is concerned with the problem of communicating his
religious perspective to an audience that generally remains skeptical of the power of God.
He chooses, however, to reveal the workings of God in a more benevolent manner. Though
Alyosha experiences a traumatic moment during which his faith is shaken, his ecstatic
vision of heaven provides him with a spiritual strength and joy that will be with him
forever.

Similarly, Raskolnikov experiences great suffering in his refusal to accept

responsibility for his crime, but all suffering disappears as the grace of God works
through him:
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And what did all, all the torments of the past amount to now? Everything,
even his crime, even his sentence and punishment appeared to him now,
in the first transport of feeling, a strange extraneous event that did not
seem even to have happened to him... he could not think of anything long...
he could only feel (558).

Tarwater, Haze and O'Connor's other reborn characters, on the other hand,
experience shock rather than ecstacy, pain rather than joy, in their encounters with God.
The narrator of The Violent Bear It Away

describes the painful aftermath of Tarwater's

moment of revelation during his struggle with the Devil:

He stood clenching the blackened burnt-out pine bough. Then after a
moment he began to move forward again slowly. He knew that he could not
turn back now.
revelation.

He knew that his destiny forced him on to a final

His scorched eyes no longer looked hollow or as if they were

meant only to guide him forward.

They looked as if, touched with a coal

like the lips of the prophet, they would never be used for ordinary sights
again (262).

God's grace has worked Its way through Tarwater's soul so rapidly and so violently that he
has not merely been touched, but scorched by It. Though they may view the mechanics of
grace differently, O'Connor and Dostoevsky nevertheless share a vision of God as a living,
active Being who makes His presence manifest in the souls of the most brutal of criminals
as well as in the hearts of the most pious of prophets.
This orthodox view of mankind's relationship to God sets Flannery O'Connor and
Fyodor Dostoevsky apart from many of the other writers and philosophers of the modern
age. They share with existentialists the recognition that the modern world, devoid of any
concern for its spiritual health and obsessed with material progress, has alienated itself
from the source of its own being. Like many existentialist thinkers, O'Connor and
Dostoevsky remain contemptuous of any philosophical system that seeks to restrict human
consciousness by limiting it solely to the realm of the material.

Characters like Rayber,

The Misfit, Luzhin, and Svidrigailov are meant to illustrate the limits of modernist
concepts based purely on rationalism, utilitarianism, and materialism. Yet these
characters take anti-materialism one step further, by insisting on the need not merely
for a "spiritual" life, but for a religious life as well, one steeped in ancient Christian
tradition.

As Christian existentialist writers, O'Connor and Dostoevsky emphatically

insist on the necessity of maintaining orthodox Christian traditions; to O'Connor this
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meant embracing Catholicism, to Dostoevsky this meant embracing Russian Orthodoxy.
Nevertheless, both writers share highly conservative views on spiritual matters strongly
encouraged by their participation in Christian religions that emphasize above all the
sanctity of the "Holy Tradition." As devout Christians in what they perceived to be an age
of disbelief, both writers felt isolated from the intellectual and cultural mainstream of
their day.

O ’Connor considered herself to be a part of the conservative Southern traditon;

Dostoevsky felt kinship with the Slavophile movement of the late nineteenth century.
Being "outsiders," they felt free to develop a critique of the modern world which was both
unrelenting and unforgiving, yet which nevertheless offered the possibility of hope.

Both

writers loved their native lands, finding in the South and in pre-Soviet Russia a respect
for God, community, and tradition which they believed to be rapidly disappearing
throughout the rest of the world.

If modern humanity could relinquish its pride and learn

once again to accept God's grace and love, O'Connor and Dostoevsky believed, then mankind
would be delivered from its present state of estrangement, frustration, and uncertainty.
"Dostoevsky," concludes his biographer Joseph Frank,"... finally chose to take his
stand with the existential irrational of the 'leap of faith' against [the] demand that religion
be brought down to earth and submit to the criterion of human reason" (198).

O'Connor

arrived at the same conclusion. Human reason, with its ever-expanding ability to
manipulate the natural world through the use of various scientific methods, will never
create a better world as long as mankind continues to resist God.

Characters like Haze,

Tarwater, Raskolnikov, and Alyosha are meant to illustrate the idea that God alone, and not
humanity, can fulfill the promises made by the promoters of the "modern secular utopia."
That two writers who on the surface might appear to bear little resemblence to one
another should share in common so many ideas and literary techniques illustrates the fact
that antimodernism has not been confined primarily to a single century, nor to one region
or continent; nor is it a tradition that, as Lears implies, has offered little but reassuring
advice and palliative remedies to people who find little solace in the materialistic
obsessions of the modern world. O'Connor and Dostoevsky offer a critique of modern
culture that has little patience with those who seek simple answers but which claims
much for those who are willing to accept the responsibilities and uncertainties of living
according to the Word of God.
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